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This study explores the role of development 
assistance to finance the required growth to 
reduce  extreme  poverty  by  half  in  2015  in 
Africa.  The  study  utilizes  the  financing  gap 
and  “optimal”  aid  allocation  models  to 
explore  the  implications  of  efficient  aid 
utilization  and  global-aid  allocation  on  total 
aid required to meet goal 1 of the MDGs. The 
findings  suggest  that  efficiency  in  the 
utilization  of  development  assistance  by 
recipients, or optimal disbursement of aid by 
donors would take the Africa  region  a long 
way in reaching the target without additional 
assistance. This evidence provides empirical 
support  to  the  recent  debate  on  aid-
effectiveness in particular and reforming aid 
architecture in general.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Foreign aid continues to be one of the most contentious issues in the development circles. Here 
are a few screaming headlines concerning mainly Africa: 
 
“Extreme poverty—defined by the World Bank as incomes of less than US$1 per day—can be 
eliminated globally by the year 2025, through carefully planned development aid”  Jeferry 
Sachs, “Ending poverty: Economic possibility of our time”, 2005. 
 
“The promise of a Big Solution to a very Big Problem is an outlier in the practice of economics 
where usually economists study marginal changes to existing systems or policies to generate 
marginal improvements. No serious economist that I know of is proposing a Big Plan to triple 
US per capita income, or to end poverty in the US” William Easterly, “The Big Push De javou” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 44(1):2006. 
 
 
“Aid has not only often failed to meet its objectives; it has also rarely dealt with the underlying 
issues of poverty and weak societies…. Often, aid has left recipient populations unstable, 
distracted and more dependent” President Paul Kagame, Financial Times, May 7 2009 
  
In Africa, most experts agree that MDGs are stretch targets without significant boost in the 
quantity and quality of aid, resurrecting the Big-push approach to development. For example, 
Sachs et al (2004) argued in their high profile report that African countries in general need a 
doubling of aid to unlock low-equilibrium traps that is caused mainly by low level of savings and 
indivisibilities in some key investments at the threshold. This has further fuelled the debate on 
the nexus between aid and growth on the one hand, and growth and poverty on the other. Some 
of the critiques (e.g. Easterly‟s (2006)) adopt a more cautious approach to development finance, 
while others question the existence of poverty traps in Africa (e.g. Kraay and Radatz, 2006). As 
the  debate  among  academics  continues,  the  practitioners  in  the  development  community, 
including  the  UN,  and  premier  institutions  such  as  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  use  the 
attainment  of  the  MDGs  as  their  benchmark  for  development  assistance,  as  reflected  in  the 
outcome statements of the series of G8 meetings since 2005.   
 
The  question  remains  how  sensitive  are  such  results  to  assumptions  about  growth-poverty 
projections,  efficiency  or  productivity  of  aid  and  improvements  in  the  overall  institutional 
environment.  
 
This study attempts to explore the aid-growth-poverty nexus in some detail using cross-country 
framework. Specifically, it is concerned with the following: What is the state of the financing 
gap to secure a growth rate consistent with the attainment of goal 1 of the MDGs in 2015 in 
Africa? What is the role of development assistance or aid in filling some of these gaps? How 
sensitive  is  estimates  of  financing  gap  to  assumptions  about  productivity/efficiency  of 
investment/aid? Does donor behavior matter in this regard? 
 
There is a large literature on the link between aid and growth where some reported a strong link 
between  aid  and  growth  irrespective  of  country-circumstances,  and  some  others  found  no   6 
correlation at all
1. In the middle we find some who argue that aid may be effective mainly if 
there are good policies and institutions (Collier and Dollar, 1999). The growth-poverty link is left 
as self-evident. If aid can promote growth, it is assumed that it will certainly reduce poverty. In 
this study we attempt to establish the nexus from aid to growth and to poverty in order t o reflect 
further on the role of efficient utilization of aid by recipients and better re-allocation by donors.  
 
This paper extends existing studies on aid -growth-poverty nexus in the following ways. First, 
unlike previous studies (e.g. Devarajan et al, 2002), we use growth-poverty link derived from an 
elasticity that varies until the target period (2015). Most studies so far used a constant elasticity, 
which certainly has overstated significantly the growth required to meet the MDGs. For instance, 
the average rate in real GDP growth required to meet the MDGs falls from the widely accepted 
7% to 4.5% if elasticities of poverty are allowed to vary over time (see Bigsten and Shimeles, 
2007).  
 
Secondly, we allow the basic parameter that links aid and growth ( the Incremental Capital 
Output Ratio) to respond to factors that improve total productivity of a country in the areas of 
political  stability,  property  rights,  investment  risk,  and  other  indicators  of  good  economic 
governance.  
 
Third, we allow donor preference to be guided only by poverty reduction objectives to capture if 
aid reallocation matters to financing needs to reach the MDGs at the country as well as 
continental level.  
 
The key finding of this paper is that a typical African country may not need a dditional aid to 
reduce poverty by half in 2015 if efficiency of aid utilization is improved and (or) aid is 
optimally distributed to minimize global poverty. Not surprisingly, quality of institutions is part 
of the story in dramatically improving the effi ciency of aid utilization (or investment in broad 
sense), to which African governments and their leaders have a big leverage. These results imply 
that the current drive to reform the aid architecture in general and aid -effectiveness in particular 
could have large impact on the financing needs of goal 1 of the MDGs in Africa.  
 
The next section outlines the models and approaches used to capture the aid-growth-poverty 
nexus and data sources, section 3 discusses the results and Section 4 concludes the paper.  
   
                                                 
1 Example, White, 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnside and Dollar 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 
2000, 2001;  Lensik and White, 2001; Easterly et al, 2003, Rajan and Subramanian, 2008. See also Roodman (2007) 
for some of the important drawbacks of cross-country empirics on aid and growth.    7 
2.  Methodology and Data Sources 
 
2.1. Financing gap model 
 
In order to apply the financing gap model
2, there are two important policy parameters whose 
calibrations determine the basic results.  The first is the amount of growth required to reach the 
MDGs, which is driven by the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth
3. The second is the 
amount of aid flows needed to support such growth, which is mainly driven by the Incremental 
Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) parameter. Accurate representation of the se two parameters and a 
test of their sensitivity to different assumptions hopefully provide robustness to our results. With 
regard to the first, we use analytical results in the growth -poverty nexus based on Lorenz 
functions for a sub-set of African countries for which we have the requisite data.  
 
Following Kakwani (1991) and Datt (1998), the Lorenz function is the basic building block for 
analyzing the growth rate required to halve poverty
4 by 2015 with the following properties: 
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Where, L is the share of the bottom p percent of the population in aggregate consumption, π is a 
vector  of  parameters  of  the  Lorenz  curve  estimable  from  a  specific  functional  form  that 
characterize income distribution. P is a poverty measure obtained from the slope of the Lorenz 
curve at poverty line z, per capita income μ, and parameters of the Lorenz function.  
 
There are two frequently used functional forms to capture Lorenz curves: the general Quadratic 
Lorenz function (Villasenor and Arnold, 1989) and the Beta Lorenz function (Kakwani, 1980) 
for which there is a widely available freeware (POVCAL)
5 to estimate the underlying parameters 
and poverty indices commonly used in the development literature (see also Datt, 1998 for further 
details). Once the parameters of the Lorenz function are estimated it is possible to use established 
results to compute the amount of growth required reaching MDGs without changes in income 
distribution, and alternatively the amount of r eduction in inequality needed to reach MDGs 
without growth. The combination of these two scenarios provide what is known as pro -poor 
growth  scenarios  where  we  have  at  one  extreme  a  growth  process  that  leaves  inequality 
unchanged (mildly pro-poor)
6 and on the other extreme a redistribution process where a certain 
percentage of income from each individual is raised in a form of tax and distributed equally 
                                                 
2 A rich discussion of this model with its severe limitation is found in Easterly (1999) 
3 The methodological section on growth-poverty nexus draws heavily from Bigsten and Shimeles (2007) 
4 We use the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) indices of poverty, which among suggested in the literature, meet 
most of the desirable properties. See Haggenars (1987) for an excellent review of the literature on the measurement 
of poverty.  
5 www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms/tools/povcal 
 
6 See for example Bigsten and Shimeles (2003) for a review of different approaches to measuring pro-poor growth.    8 
among all individuals (a strongly pro-poor). To operationalize this, we use the well-known result 
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At half of P0, the Lorenz function would be: 
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Thus, to compute the per capita income level μ* consistent with poverty level 0.5*P0 without a 
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Since thee  LHS of equation (5) and the numerator on the RHS are known parameters, it is 
possible to compute the cumulative growth required to reach MDGs by 2015 assuming that the 
Lorenz  curve  remains  unchanged.  Analogously,  we  can  evaluate  the  amount  of  inequality 
reduction required to meet MDGs if growth does not occur at all. Following Kakwani (1993), we 
know that the slope of the Lorenz curve at which poverty is half its original level without a 
change in mean per capita income must satisfy the condition: 
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In addition,  (6) can be rewritten as: 
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      (7) 
Using equations (6) and (7), we can solve for λ, which is proportional change in the Gini index 
needed for a certain growth rate β. Actually, equation (6) and (7) can generate a set of per capita 
income and Gini index consistent with headcount ratio at half the original poverty level, which 
may be termed as coordinates of an iso-poverty curve (e.g. Bigsten and Shimeles, 2003, ECLAC 
et al, 2002).  For a given λ, it can be shown that the Gini coefficient of the new Lorenz curve is 
given by: 
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Where G(Y) is the original Gini coefficient (observed from the data), which is defined over a 
vector Y representing the structure of income (ranked from the poorest to the richest), and Y* is a 
vector that represents the simulated income distribution consistent with poverty level at MDG 
target poverty level.  
 
The relations between β and λ then form the core of the growth-inequality nexus to meet the 
MDGs.  The  set  up  given  in  equations  (6)  and  (7)  allows  for  the  consideration  of  several   9 
scenarios to reach the MDGs. Apart from the extremes, for instance, one can work out the rate of 
change in the Gini coefficient required to meet the MDGs if the economy follows a historical 
growth trend up to 2015. Or alternatively it is possible to compute the growth rate required to 
sustain a certain degree of worsening of income distribution in light of achieving the MDGs.  
 
It should also be noted that the relationship between poverty inequality and per capita income is 
not  monotonic.  It  is  possible  for  poverty  to  decline  when  the  Gini  coefficient  remained 
unchanged, or even slightly increased! Similar relationship also applies with respect to growth in 
per capita income or consumption.  Thus, it is not admissible to hold the elasticity of poverty 
with  respect  to  either  income  or  the  Gini  coefficient  constant.  Following  Datt  (1997),  both 
elasticities vary with the parameters of the Lorenz curve and poverty levels. In light of this, our 
estimates of the GDP growth rate required to reach the MDGs is based on elasticity measures 
that vary until the target period.  
 
The link between growth required to reducing poverty by half in 2015 and aid is established 
through  the  Two-Gap  model.  Four  decades  ago,  Chenery  and  Strout  (1966)  developed  a 
theoretical framework to put the role of foreign aid in the perspective of promoting economic 
growth  in  recipient  countries.  This  framework  popularly  known  as  the  Two-gap  model  of 
economic growth stipulated that developing countries face two constraints for steady growth 
arising out of the concept of „resource-gap‟: the saving constraint (because domestic savings fall 
short  of  the  desired  investment  rate  dictated  by  the  efficiency  of  capital)  and  the  foreign 
exchange constraint (because export earnings fall short of the desired level of imports).  
 
The model therefore argued that foreign aid could be made available to the tune of the gap to fill 
one of the two binding constraints (domestic savings or foreign exchange). This approach has 
remained entrenched even to this very day in the lending and foreign aid policy of the World 
Bank since the onset of the Decades of Structural Adjustment programs. The two-gap model 
devises  an  allocation  rule  for  each  recipient  country  on  the  basis  of  the  binding  resource 
constraint prevailing. The exercise is therefore mainly meant to come up with a total amount of 
aid needed to promote economic development in poor countries. Following Easterly (2003), the 
Two-Gap model states that targeted economic growth depends on investment as a share of GDP, 
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Where I is required investment, Y is output (GDP), g is target GDP growth, A is aid and S is 
domestic savings. The parameter  is known as ICOR, which measures the efficiency or quality 
of investment
8.    
 
Obtaining a “good” estimate of ICOR has been notoriously challenging so far (see for example, 
Easterly, 1999, 2003 for an excellent account of it and critique of the two-gap model). The best 
                                                 
7 This result can also be obtained by invoking the neo-classical Harrod-Domar growth model. See also Agenor 
(2006) for an excellent synthesis of the Two-Gap model.  
8 It is possible to allow for a parameter to capture leakages in the translation of aid into investment.    10 
one can do is work out the sensitivities of aid required to alternative specifications of ICOR, 
possibly derived from a correlation weight with institutional quality. It is very much likely that 
ICOR can respond to shifts in key macroeconomic climates and institutions.  
 
In this paper ICOR is estimated in two alternative ways. The first, and most common, approach 
is to take an average of ICOR over a long period for each country based on equation (9a). The 
second is to fit a regression equation of equation (9a) with complex lag structure of error 
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Predicted values of g from equation (10) are used to compute the ICOR
9. Equation (10) also 
allows for unobserved country-specific effects that are invariant over a long period. On the basis 
of estimates of ICOR and target growth rate to meet the MDGs obtained from Lorenz functions, 
we can generate the total amount of investment or finance required to support such growth rate. 
We then compute the „resource-gap‟ as the difference between required investment rate and 
actual investment rate for each country. Since by assumption aid is the source of financing such 
gaps, it is possible to get the extra aid flows needed to meet the MDGs. This approach has been 
the basis of most of the influential reports on financing MDGs in recent years.  
 
2.2. “Optimal” aid allocation model 
 
 
The Financing Gap model discussed in the foregoing assumes that total aid flows into a country 
are more or less given exogenously so that any of initial conditions or subsequent economic 
changes does not affect its flows. In addition, the aid-growth link is established in the Financing 
Gap model through investment, while it is possible to obtain elasticity values directly
10. In light 
of this, we introduce a simple model of aid-allocation that does rely on the empirical properties 
of aid-growth nexus to examine the optimal aid flow that can be a basis for the debate on how 
much aid can play in reducing poverty faster in the African continent. Using the insights of 
Collier and Dollar (1999) the optimal aid allocation can be viewed as an outcome  of donor‟s 
objective to  minimize poverty in  each recipient country
11. Given the following definition of 
variables; 
 
P=aggregate poverty in the African continent 
Pi =poverty in the i
th country 
i = population share of i
th country; 
i = mean per capita income in country i 
                                                 
9 Note that the parameter αi  can be regarded as representing long-term” growth for each country.  
10 This brings into the picture the aid-growth nexus, which is one of the most extensively researched topics in the aid 
literature. There are theoretical possibilities for aid not to have any impact on long term growth or even can be a 
hindrance (e.g. due to diminishing returns of aid, or nature of growth dynamics; see, Berthemley, 2006). Thus, it 
would be sensible to use a framework that is based on the empirical relationship between growth and aid.   
11 Other works that used optimal aid allocation model in the context of this study include Trumball and Wall (1994);  
Sawada et al (2008).   11 
zi = the poverty line 
mi = the Gini coefficient that measures income inequality 
Yi = real GDP in ith country 
Ai = aid as a percentage of GDP received by each country, 
Ā = the total aid allocated in a particular year in say dollars 
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The specification of the poverty function in (11) is following the literature on the measurement 
of poverty that defines poverty to be a function of mean per capita income, the poverty line and 
the measure of income distribution.
12 The population share is entered into the aggregate poverty 
function by invoking one of the desirable properties of the popular poverty measures, which is 
additive decomposability across sub-groups (see Foster et al, 1984 and Foster and Shorrocks, 
1991). Thus, global poverty is a sum of poverty in each country weighted by its population share.  
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We can rewrite [12] as: 
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12 See Ravallion (1992), Kakwani (1991) . 
13 We note that the second-order condition for minimum implies that the second-derivative of the poverty function 
with respect to mean per capita income to be negative. This is fair since the rate at which poverty declines with 
respect to growth in mean per capita income is diminishing assuming other things constant.   12 
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Inserting the value of  obtained in (14), we can solve for the optimal Ai 
* as follows: 
Let: 































     
 
So that the total aid allocated to a given country depends on the value of wI, which among other 
things depends on the level of poverty, the population share of the country among aid receiving 
countries and the responsiveness of poverty to a change in per capita income growth. It is also 
easy to compute the rate of change in global aid required to reach a target level of poverty. Using 













































        (15) 
 
Equation (15) states that the rate of change in global aid needed to reduce poverty by a certain 
rate, say half, depends primarily on current level of poverty and the responsiveness of poverty to 
aid. The higher initial poverty and the lower the responsiveness of poverty to aid, the higher is 
the aid requirement.  
 
 
 To  operationalize  the  frameworks  set  out  in  this  section,  we  compiled  data  on  basic 
macroeconomic indicators from WDI (2007), on institutions from International Country Risk 
Guide (1984-2004), and other regional and geographic data from the Barro-Lee (1997) data set.   13 
The data source to compute the growth rate required to meet MDGs and associated elasticities is 
fully explained in Bigsten and Shimeles (2007).  
 
3. Discussion of results 
 
Table (1) and (2) provide a profile of aid flow to Africa for the period 1960-2004. Accordingly, 
there has been a steady rise in the flow aid to Africa, from 5% as a share of GDP in the 1960s to 
15% in the early 2000. The notable change is the share of aid in total investment over the last 
forty years. It has increased from 40% in the 1960s to nearly 80% in the early 2000, suggesting 
perhaps the role foreign aid plays in financing development in Africa.  
 
There are some clear patterns on the flow of aid to Africa in the last four decades. In general, 
poorest countries received proportionately higher aid than richest (relatively speaking) countries 
within the continent, perhaps indicating donor preference to support poor economies. On the 
other hand, also, we notice a larger share of aid going to Island countries, compared to land-
locked countries, which may be explainable by national interests of donor countries.  The general 
pattern of aid flow seems to be a little mixed with respect to institutional quality. Countries with 
better sense of democratic accountability, stable government, good socio-economic condition, 
better investment profile, less corruption, and ethnic tension seem to have received relatively 
larger aid during the period under study. Where as, countries with high degree of internal and 
external  conflict,  strong  presence  of  the  military  and  religious  groups  in  politics,  relatively 
chaotic countries also received better aid. Thus, donors seem to favor both aspects of institutional 
spectrum, which may be explainable by the desire to avert humanitarian crisis somewhere as 
well as promote development elsewhere. 
 
In short, the aid-growth relationship that one attempts to find from cross-country regressions 
already exhibits a strong presence of simultaneity bias, which prevents sensible generalizations 
on whether or not, aid promotes growth in Africa. That is an identification problem arises in the 
direction  of  causation  as  depicted  in  Figure  2  where  aid  flows  have  increased  in  times  of 
economic decline as well as recovery.   
 
The first set of results based on the Financing Gap model indicates  that Africa‟s total aid need to 
be doubled to reduce extreme poverty by half in 2015 (Table 3). This finding is consistent with 
the current thinking of the Big-Push approach to development financing, particularly for the 
African continent. However, how robust is this result? Based on an estimating equation given in 
(10), the value of ICOR has changed substantially. On the average, the ICOR fell from 6 to 4 (an 
improvement of 33%) when a different estimation method was used (Table 4). The regression 
based estimate of  ICOR could  be regarded as  “an ideal  ICOR” for a typical  country in  the 
continent to attain controlling of course for country-level effects which could reflect better the 
quality  of  investment  in  Africa  (see  also  Easterly,  2003).  In  this  case,  current  aid  flow  is 
sufficient for Africa to be able to reduce extreme poverty by half in 2015. The implications of 
such divergent results are interesting for the debate on scaling up aid to Africa.  
 
The driving workhorse of the Big-Push paradigm is the belief that African countries are stuck in 
low-equilibrium  trap  that  can  only  be  broken  through  massive  injection  of  capital  and 
technology. Our result points out to the possibility that if current aid flow is sustained, then, it   14 
would be sufficient to support the growth rate required to cut poverty by half!  Or in other words, 
even when this estimate may not accurately reflect the quality of investment in Africa, efforts to 
improve efficiency of investment and thus foreign aid could take the continent a long way in 
reaching the MDGs.  
 
One of the often-emphasized topics in the recent literature on growth in Africa is the issue of 
quality of economic and political institutions. Given that institutions are quasi-endogenous, that 
is, are shaped by collective choices and decisions at the highest level of government, it can be 
argued that it is possible for African countries to enhance the quality of governance with a lot of 
good will and perhaps less effort. If that can happen, it is possible to get reasonable progress in 
total productivity, a variable closely associated with ICOR.  
 
To reflect the role of institutions in affecting ICOR, we ran a regression of ICOR on the average 
of a set of indicators of institutional quality based on data provided by ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide). The variables that capture institutional quality are bureaucratic quality, 
democratic accountability, government stability, socio-economic conditions, investment profile, 
internal  conflict,  external  conflict,  corruption,  military in  politics,  law  and order,  religion  in 
politics and ethnic strife. For each country we took a long-term average covering the period 
1980-2004,  hoping  to  capture  the  sustained  quality  of  overall  institutions  that  support 
productivity of investment. Other control variables used in the regression include dummies for 
petroleum-producing economies, islands, and land-locked countries. The result as reported in 
Table 5 is revealing. A 10% improvement in the quality of overall institutions could lead to a 
1.3% decline in the value of ICOR in a typical case, a result which is quite interesting on its own 
right
14. ICOR has also geographic sensitivity. Comparatively speaking petroleum -producing 
countries are inefficient, while countries that are land-locked and Island seem to be doing well in 
investment utilization.  
 
Figure (2) also reports an interesting association between indicator of governance and total 
productivity growth obtained from a simple   growth accounting model estimated for a large 
number of African countries for the period 1960 -2002. We note that countries with better 
institutions exhibit higher level of productivity growth and thus lower ICOR. Thus, it would be 
worthwhile to examine the challenges of improving the quality of institutions in Africa, and how 
foreign aid can be deployed to meet that end.  
 
As it is, resource gaps estimated on the basis of ICOR has its own limitations, which have been 
discussed in Section 2. It would be int eresting to know how the optimal aid -allocation model 
performed in the African context and perhaps use the results as a guide for research in the aid -
growth nexus. It was mentioned in Section 2 that the strength of the optimal aid-allocation model 
is that it allows explicitly for aid-growth nexus that could be drawn from empirical evidence. If 
for instance, it is found that aid does not have any significant impact on either long-term growth 
or poverty (e.g as in Rajan and Subramanian, 2008), then, there is  no point in spending effort to 
compute the additional aid needed to reach a certain target growth rate. Rather the point worth 
putting in some effort would be in understanding why aid cannot bring about growth. Secondly, 
                                                 
14 Index of institutional quality gets better as it increases in value.  
   15 
this approach takes into account donors‟ preference while in the Financing Gap models supply of 
aid is exogenous to the model.  
 
The first challenge one confronts in using the optimal-aid allocation model is to find a significant 
relationship between long-term growth and aid. One of the serious problems in the empirical 
literature is the simultaneity bias that plagues cross-country data on aid and growth. That is, it is 
not easy to disentangle the effect of aid on long-term growth, since the supply of aid itself is 
partly a function of long-term growth.  In the context of Africa, Figure (2) provides a vivid 
picture where aid in general has been rising over time as a share of GDP, while growth had a 
cyclical trend, mostly on a downward direction, to a certain extent supporting the simultaneity 
bias argument.  In such a situation, one has to resort to system equation approach where both aid 
and growth appear as dependent variables in different specifications, or use instruments for aid 
that are not correlated with growth but are correlated with aid alone. All of these methods have 
been attempted in the literature. Some used for instance Colonial history, geography and other 
exogenous variables that are correlated with aid but not with economic growth to disentangle the 
supply  side  from  the  growth-effect  model  and  others  use  lags  of  the  explanatory  variables, 
including the dependent variable itself to instrument for the endogenity of aid flows.  
 
To illustrate the endogenity problem, consider Table (6), which reports results from a regression 
of log per captia on log aid using Random-effects model where unobserved country-specific 
effects are controlled for. The coefficient associated with aid is negative and significant implying 
that more aid is bad for growth
15. As expected, this could be either true, or largely driven by the 
simultaneity bias we have discussed above. To resolve this issue, we resorted to quintile 
regression method, which among other things reduces the data to a relatively homogenous group 
as dictated by the level of quintile. In our case, since the level of economic development drives 
aid, we conducted the regressions by income decile and found a positive relationship between aid 
and long-term growth in each case. While further work is warranted to examine in detail whether 
our result is robust, it is sufficient for the purpose of operationalizing our model.  
 
On the basis of the coefficient on aid obtained from the quintile regressions, Table (7) reports 
optimal share of aid for African countries for which we have the prerequisite in formation. It is 
useful to note that the model stipulates that if the objective of donors is to minimize poverty in 
Africa, more aid should go to countries with high initial (current) poverty, and those that can 
utilize aid efficiently for the purposes of  growth and can make maximum impact on poverty. 
These three sets of conditions as well as share of population would drive the optimal aid 
allocation rule. As reported in Table (8) the optimal aid allocation rule and the actual aid flows 
have significant divergence. Poverty efficient aid-allocation explains only about 20% of current 
aid flow (Figure 3), while in the rest of cases aid allocation is driven by other factors. This takes 
us back to the current issue on aid-architecture where donors are urged to focus on development 
and recipients are advised to use aid-efficiently.  
 
Finally, it is important to notice the tension between efficient utilization of aid and high initial 
poverty in driving the optimal-aid allocation. Research has shown that countries with high initial 
poverty tend to have low elasticity of poverty with respect to growth and as Table (7) showed 
also not significantly higher efficiency in aid utilization. Thus, being poor currently alone does 
                                                 
15 The same result holds when the dependent variable is growth   16 
not warrant more aid, it has to be accompanied by high utilization of aid for growth and poverty 
reduction.  
 
4. Conclusions  
 
This paper attempted to examine the financing of growth targeted at reducing extreme poverty by 
half in 2015 by African countries. It employed the Financing Gap model and a simple model of 
optimal aid allocation to explore the issues. Preliminary results suggest that the financing gap 
critically depends on the parameters driving the target growth rate and the quality of investment 
in the case of the Financing Gap model. Results show that the total aid needed to ensure the 
growth target consistent with the reduction of extreme poverty by half ranges from the doubling 
of current aid to the sufficiency of current aid. Such divergent results point out to the importance 
of improving the quality of investment in Africa, which partly could be determined by the overall 
political and economic institutions. Our estimate for instance suggests that a 10% improvement 
in the overall quality of institutions could lead to an improvement in the value of ICOR by about 
1.3%.  
 
Thus, reforms directed at good governance go a long way in improving the quality of investment 
to generate more growth. With regard to the issue of aid and growth, the paper used a model of 
optimal aid allocation where the link between aid and growth was the crucial link to compute the 
resources needed to minimize poverty in Africa. The model predicts that donors would prefer to 
give more aid to countries with high initial poverty and efficient at translating aid into growth 
and  growth  into  poverty  reduction.  A  comparison  of  actual  aid  allocation  with  simulated 
(„optimal‟) one indicated that only a small part of aid allocation is consistent with the objective 
of reducing poverty in Africa. This further reinforces the legitimacy of the current debate to 
reform the aid architecture! A couple of heuristic estimates on the link between aid and growth 
suggest that at least for the sample of countries covered in the regressions aid has a potential to 
promote short term (Table 9) as well as long-term growth (Table 10).   17 
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1960-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-2004  1960-2004 
Aid and Government (aggregates)            
Aid(% of central government Expenditures)  22.03  34.21  38.95  29.93  34.82 
Aid(% of GDP)  5.34  8.73  13.4  14.61  11.07 
Aid(% of gross capital formation)  40.08  46.76  76.57  79.59  63.67 
Aid by special characteristics            
Aid (% of GDP)           
petroleum exporting countries  5.49  9.81  9.48  12.79  9.6 
non-petroleum exporting countries  5.32  8.61  13.77  14.78  11.22 
Aid per-capita (current USD)           
Petroleum exporting countries  5.18  24  43.07  47.95  39.22 
non-petroleum exporting countries  8.44  28.97  59.01  55.94  30.31 
Geography           
Aid (% of GDP)           
Island  12.51  14.22  18.07  15.07  15.06 
landlocked  4.06  7.67  8.95  9.15  7.7 
Others  4.6  8.09  14.6  17.24  11.9 
Aid per-capita (current USD)           
Island  15.81  52.19  88.12  66.81  58.33 
landlocked  8.44  36.71  66.57  53.09  42.1 
Others  6.83  22.19  48.01  54.02  33.33 
Region           
Aid (% of GDP)           
North  5.36  8.44  10.44  10.45  9.31 
East  5.53  8.4  14.744  19.49  13.11 
Central  6.2  6.64  8.32  8.51  7.44 
South  5.03  10.69  10.35  10.37  9.27 
West  4.74  9.11  18.31  18.72  13.45 
Aid per-capita (constant USD)           
North  5.92  25.4  50.53  41.68  31.21 
East  8.3  21.31  57.76  61.02  39.5   21 
Central  8.84  23.7  40.2  38.93  27.98 
South  9.29  46.63  77.76  71.16  51.88 
West  7.92  26.6  56.42  54.7  37.6 
 
Source: authors‟ computations based on data from OECD/DAC various years 
 
 
Table 2. Profile of aid by Investment Risk and Bureaucratic Quality (top and bottom 
Quantiles)   
   
Classification by              Decadal Averages    
            1960-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-2004  1980-2004 
Aid (% of GDP)               
Democratic Accountability             
Best        N.A  N.A  14.81  13.07  11.44 
Worst        N.A  N.A  12.71  15.44  9.79 
Government Stability               
Best        N.A  N.A  13.03  18.37  11.88 
Worst        N.A  N.A  8.43  10.46  8.09 
Socio-Economic Conditions             
Best        N.A  N.A  11.09  12.07  13.12 
Worst        N.A  N.A  11.74  12.4  11.19 
Investment Profile               
Best        N.A  N.A  15.08  13.76  10.14 
Worst        N.A  N.A  14.02  10.65  9.02 
Internal Conflict               
Best        N.A  N.A  9.81  15.33  9.99 
Worst        N.A  N.A  14.03  15.99  11.58 
External Conflict               
Best        N.A  N.A  13.34  16.23  9.83 
Worst        N.A  N.A  14.41  14.84  11.92 
Corruption                 
Best        N.A  N.A  16.75  14.25  17.45 
Worst        N.A  N.A  18.45  16.88  9.886 
Military in Politics                 22 
Best        N.A  N.A  17.57  13.1  9.46 
Worst        N.A  N.A  16.59  17.59  12.14 
Religion in Politics               
Best        N.A  N.A  11.78  10.48  9.25 
Worst        N.A  N.A  15.14  18.9  12.01 
Law and Order               
Best        N.A  N.A  13.62  15.24  9.45 
Worst        N.A  N.A  16.44  11.38  10.23 
Ethnic Tension               
Best        N.A  N.A  12.92  15.25  11.27 
Worst        N.A  N.A  3.37  14.49  8.41 
Aid per-capita (in 
constant 1995 USD)             
Democratic Accountability             
Best        N.A  N.A  65.92  54.92  35.38 
Worst        N.A  N.A  46.44  45.84  26.17 
Government Stability               
Best        N.A  N.A  44.66  57.42  31.3 
Worst        N.A  N.A  36.4  43.45  41.05 
Socio-Economic Conditions             
Best        N.A  N.A  51.23  46.68  35.43 
Worst        N.A  N.A  64.21  67.15  46.2 
           
 
….contd.   
Classification by             Decadal Averages   
            1960-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-2004  1980-2004 
Investment Profile           
Best  N.A  N.A  52.3  50.8  30.05 
Worst  N.A  N.A  59.96  51.44  40.3 
Internal Conflict           
Best  N.A  N.A  49.68  60.21  38.93 
Worst        N.A  N.A  52.77  51.24  36.4 
External Conflict               
Best        N.A  N.A  67.7  68.74  35.8 
Worst        N.A  N.A  71.25  52.24  34.7 
Corruption                   23 
Best        N.A  N.A  76.32  55.82  46.22 
Worst        N.A  N.A  59.4  51.34  29.99 
Military in Politics               
Best        N.A  N.A  94.48  54.5  28.4 
Worst        N.A  N.A  51.36  43.55  32.03 
Religion in Politics               
Best        N.A  N.A  47.24  43.77  29.26 
Worst        N.A  N.A  101.74  69.63  49.93 
Law and Order               
Best        N.A  N.A  61.25  51.79  31.88 
Worst        N.A  N.A  41.15  43.16  22.91 
Ethnic Tension               
Best        N.A  N.A  45.68  61.42  34.55 
Worst        N.A  N.A  52.84  42.88  25.33 
Aid flow (by per-capita GDP Quintiles-GDP per-capita in constant 1995 USD)   
Poorest        5.28  11.55  15.98  21.5  15.19 
Richest        6.65  6.51  4.3  2.38  4.39 
Source: author‟s computations based on data from International Country Risk Guide and OECD/DAC 
 
 
Table 3: Financing target growth rates to reduce poverty by half in 2015: mean ICOR’s 
Country Name  Annual growth rate in 
per capita 
consumption  


















2004) % of 
GDP 









required (% of 
GDP) 
Algeria  1.02  2  3  9  32  28  0  28  0 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.5  2  3  6  21  22  5  15  -7 
Morocco  0.66  2  3  5  21  23  3  13  -10 
Tunisia  0.76  2  3  7  23  27  2  18  -9 
Benin  3.7  3  7  4  6  16  11  30  14 
Botswana  2.36  2  5  5  38  28  5  22  -5 
Burkina Faso  3.01  3  6  7  11  19  14  41  22 
Burundi  2.05  2  4  5  8  13  20  22  9 
Cameroon  1.32  3  4  4  16  18  5  14  -5 
Cape Verde  3.1  2  5  8  18  27  26  42  16   24 
Central African 
Republic 
4.94  2  7  5  6  11  13  39  28 
Chad  3.9  3  7  3  1  15  13  19  4 
Comoros  3.7  2  6  6  6  17  22  38  21 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  4.2  3  7  5  4  9  10  35  26 
Congo, Rep.  3.6  3  7  7  13  28  7  47  19 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.84  3  4  6  10  13  5  23  10 
Eritrea  4  2  6  10  13  25  28  65  40 
Ethiopia  4.24  3  7  4  11  15  12  26  11 
Gabon  2.5  3  5  7  25  29  2  39  10 
Gambia, The  3.11  3  7  6  13  20  24  39  19 
Ghana  1.9  3  5  4  11  16  9  18  3 
Guinea  3.8  3  7  5  11  17  10  36  19 
Guinea-Bissau  4  3  7  7  0  26  49  44  19 
Kenya  1.86  3  5  7  16  18  7  36  19 
Lesotho  3.4  1  5  11  34  44  11  55  11 
Madagascar  1.9  3  5  5  5  13  11  24  11 
Malawi  2.23  3  5  4  0  15  23  22  7 
Mali  4.8  3  7  7  10  21  18  50  30 
Mauritania  2.07  3  5  7  14  21  23  30  9 
Mauritius  2.7  1  4  5  24  24  2  19  -5 
Mozambique  1.89  2  4  5  1  20  31  20  0 
Namibia  2.4  3  5  7  25  20  4  40  19 
Niger  2.85  3  6  4  5  12  15  27  15 
Nigeria  3.43  3  6  7  19  19  1  42  23 
Rwanda  1.06  2  3  4  10  15  20  12  -3 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
3.6  2  6  13  -15  28  72  72  44 
Senegal  1.8  3  4  4  5  15  13  20  5 
Seychelles  2.3  1  3  5  19  27  7  17  -9 
Sierra Leone  4.1  2  6  3  3  10  19  18  8 
South Africa  0.67  2  3  6  20  19  0  17  -2 
Sudan  3.8  2  6  3  7  15  5  18  4 
Swaziland  1.73  3  5  7  20  22  4  33  10 
Tanzania  3.41  3  6  6  5  20  18  41  21 
Togo  3.9  3  7  4  9  18  10  31  13 
Uganda  4.44  3  8  4  5  14  12  29  15   25 
Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources) 
   
Zambia  4.03  3  7  5  3  14  20  34  20 
Zimbabwe  2.33  2  5  6  13  17  4  26  9 
Average  2.76  3  5  6  12  20  14  31  11   26 
 
 
Table 4: Financing target growth rate to reduce poverty by half in 2015 regression based  ICOR 
Country Name  Annual growth 





















2004) % of 
GDP 








required (% of 
GDP) 
Algeria  1.02  2  3  4.00  32  28  0  13  -15 
Benin  3.7  3  7  2.83  6  16  11  20  4 
Botswana  2.36  2  5  6.34  38  28  5  29  2 
Burkina Faso  3.01  3  6  3.37  11  19  14  19  0 
Burundi  2.05  2  4  1.87  8  13  20  8  -5 
Cameroon  1.32  3  4  3.24  16  18  5  12  -6 




4.94  2  7  1.30  6  11  13  9  -2 
Chad  3.9  3  7  2.72  1  15  13  19  4 
Comoros  3.7  2  6  6.36  6  17  22  38  21 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
4.2  3  7  5.00  4  9  10  35  26 
Congo, Rep.  3.6  3  7  3.95  13  28  7  27  -1 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.84  3  4  2.11  10  13  5  9  -5 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
0.5  2  3  4.57  21  22  5  12  -10 
Eritrea  4  2  6  4.61  13  25  28  29  4 
Ethiopia  4.24  3  7  2.48  11  15  12  17  1 
Gabon  2.5  3  5  3.34  25  29  2  18  -11 
Gambia, The  3.11  3  7  3.16  13  20  24  21  1 
Ghana  1.9  3  5  2.40  11  16  9  11  -5 
Guinea  3.8  3  7  3.22  11  17  10  21  4 
Guinea-Bissau  4  3  7  3.16  0  26  49  21  -4 
Kenya  1.86  3  5  2.90  16  18  7  14  -4 
Lesotho  3.4  1  5  6.45  34  44  11  31  -13 
Madagascar  1.9  3  5  1.22  5  13  11  6  -7 
Malawi  2.23  3  5  4.23  0  15  23  22  7 
Mali  4.8  3  7  2.96  10  21  18  22  1 
Mauritania  2.07  3  5  3.63  14  21  23  17  -4   27 
Mauritius  2.7  1  4  5.05  24  24  2  19  -5 
Morocco  0.66  2  3  3.64  21  23  3  9  -14 
Mozambique  1.89  2  4  5.11  1  20  31  20  0 
Namibia  2.4  3  5  2.85  25  20  4  15  -5 
Niger  2.85  3  6  1.31  5  12  15  8  -4 
Nigeria  3.43  3  6  2.61  19  19  1  16  -3 
Rwanda  1.06  2  3  2.64  10  15  20  9  -6 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
3.6  2  6  12.81  -15  28  72  72  44 
Senegal  1.8  3  4  2.42  5  15  13  11  -4 
Seychelles  2.3  1  3  5.12  19  27  7  17  -9 
Sierra Leone  4.1  2  6  0.14  3  10  19  1  -9 
South Africa  0.67  2  3  2.44  20  19  0  7  -12 
Sudan  3.8  2  6  2.65  7  15  5  17  2 
Swaziland  1.73  3  5  3.94  20  22  4  18  -4 
Tanzania  3.41  3  6  3.23  5  20  18  20  0 
Togo  3.9  3  7  2.25  9  18  10  16  -2 
Tunisia  0.76  2  3  4.42  23  27  2  12  -15 
Uganda  4.44  3  8  3.29  5  14  12  26  11 
Zambia  4.03  3  7  1.54  3  14  20  10  -4 
Zimbabwe  2.33  2  5  2.18  13  17  4  10  -6 
Average  2.76  3  5  4  12  20  14  31  -1 
Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources)   28 
 
Table 5: OLS estimate of ICOR and quality of institutions in Africa: average 1984-2004-
robust statistics 
Dependent variable: mean ICOR value  Coefficient  p-value 
Average quality of institution  -0.302604***  [3.51e-05] 
Country is landlocked  -0.628996***  [0.00436] 
Country is an island  -0.854016***  [4.31e-07] 
Petroleum exporting  -0.24841  [0.259] 
Constant  4.961975***  [0] 
F-value  10.97   
Observations  437   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources) 
 
Table 6: per capita –versus aid:  Random effects model 
 
Variables   
Log of aid per capita  -0.067 
  (3.82)** 
Quality of institutions  -0.006 
  (5.32)** 
Initial GDP  0.636 
  (3.72)** 
Initial life expectancy  0.097 
  (2.85)** 
Constant  -1.053 
  -0.7 
Observations  338 
Number of country code  23 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources) 
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Table 7:Qunitile regression of log per capita GDP on aid for African countries: 1960-2004 
 
  Poorest  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  Richest 
Log of aid per capita  0.216  0.326  0.3231  0.1729  0.1828  0.1988  0.326  0.3253  0.2646  -0.0226 
  (8.38)**  (15.05)**  (8.23)**  (4.44)**  (5.56)**  (4.59)**  (4.09)**  (4.99)**  (7.07)**  -1.09 
Period Dummy  0.144  -0.0456  -0.0637  -0.0614  -0.0622  -0.1073  -0.1913  -0.1882  0.0236  0.489 
  (2.04)*  -0.86  -0.77  -0.8  -1.03  -1.38  -1.44  -1.78  -0.42  (12.09)** 
Quality of institutions  -0.005  -0.0126  -0.0071  -0.007  -0.0068  -0.011  -0.0139  -0.0249  -0.0256  -0.0212 
  -1.39  (5.86)**  (2.19)*  (2.30)*  (2.82)**  (3.52)**  (2.67)**  (6.03)**  (13.19)**  (4.22)** 
Constant  -0.037  0.7649  0.8238  1.6071  1.4977  1.6563  2.1208  3.0297  3.7492  1.7206 
  -0.13  (3.59)**  (2.24)*  (4.29)**  (4.95)**  (4.22)**  (2.98)**  (5.90)**  (14.56)**  (5.85)** 
 
Absolute value of z in parenthesis, *significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
 
Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources) 
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Table 8: Comparison of optimal aid-allocation with actual aid-allocation in selected African countries (1981-2001) 
 
  Optimal aid allocation 
Actual allocation of aid 
(1980-2001)  Difference 
Algeria  0.006269  0.006902  -0.00063 
Botswana  0.003247  0.003332  -8.4E-05 
Burkina Faso  0.032026  0.022668  0.009359 
Burundi  0.01653  0.015976  0.000554 
Cameroon  0.040722  0.016922  0.0238 
Central Africa Rep.  0.006217  0.007848  -0.00163 
Cote d'Ivore  0.032835  0.025085  0.007749 
Egypt  0.115578  0.105456  0.010123 
Ethiopia  0.144033  0.116317  0.027716 
Gambia  0.002346  0.010335  -0.00799 
Ghana  0.065927  0.02533  0.040596 
Kenya  0.043311  0.057107  -0.0138 
Lesotho  0.003296  0.006762  -0.00347 
Madagascar  0.044595  0.021091  0.023503 
Malawi  0.018178  0.044144  -0.02597 
Mali  0.016172  0.023193  -0.00702 
Mauritania  0.004045  0.011562  -0.00752 
Morocco  0.005574  0.053604  -0.04803 
Mozambique  0.032228  0.1002  -0.06797 
Namibia  0.002448  0.004239  -0.00179 
Niger  0.039349  0.022528  0.016821 
Nigeria  0.157203  0.006026  0.151176 
Rwanda  0.034269  0.020776  0.013493 
Senegal  0.017421  0.030691  -0.01327 
South Africa  0.004887  0.011281  -0.00639 
Swaziland  6.43E-05  0.003423  -0.00336 
Tanzania  0.037471  0.155556  -0.11808 
Tunisia  0.000177  0.015135  -0.01496 
Uganda  0.039552  0.017483  0.02207 
Zambia  0.011808  0.029079  -0.01727 
Zimbabwe  0.022221  0.00995  0.012271 
Total  1  1   
Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources) 
 
Table 9: GMM estimate of effect of aid on per capita GDP growth in selected African countries 
Dependent variable (Growth in per capita GDP)  Coefficient  Z-value 
Growth in lagged per capita GDP  0.528  4.53*** 
(Change in aid/GDP ratio)t-1  .002  2.05** 
(Change in aid/GDP ratio)
2
t-1  -.000047  -1.68* 
Period 3 (1987)  .007  0.4 
Period 5 (1993)  -.075  -2.42** 
Period 6 (1996)  -.027  -0.54 
Period 7 (1999)  0.0023  0.03 
Period 8 (2001)  -0.003  -0.04 
Sargan‟s over-identification test (p-value)    0.5741 
AR1    -1.86 
AR2    0.34   31 
 
Other control variables include the 12 indicators of economic and political governance.  
 *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 10: Probit estimate of correlation between aid and stability of growth* 
     
Long term aid flow (average 1960-2004)    -0.167 
    (3.18)** 
(Long term aid flow)
2 (average 1960-2004)    0.006 
    (3.29)** 
Bureaucratic quality    0.143 
    -0.89 
Democratic accountability    -0.294 
    (2.25)* 
Government stability    0.139 
    1.62 
Socio-economic conditions    0.105 
    1.06 
Investment profile    -0.143 
    -1.61 
Internal conflict    -0.018 
    -0.24 
External conflict    -0.272 
    (4.63)** 
Corruption    0.39 
    (2.28)* 
Military in politics    0.41 
    (4.24)** 
Religion in politics    0.131 
    -1.27 
Law and order    -0.007 
    -0.05 
Ethnic tension    0.26 
    (2.00)* 
Constant    1.181 
    -1.29 
Observations    164 
*Using the classification by Berthelemey (2006), a dummy is constructed for a country that experienced stable growth at least once during 1960-
2004. 
Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources) 
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Source: author‟s computations (see text for data sources)   33 
 



















































actual share of aid (average 1981-2004)   34 
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